In everyday language use, the content of an indexical sentence is determined by the parameters of the context in which it occurs. In fictional discourse, however, indexical sentences seem to behave in a nonstandard way. This paper attempts to show that the difference can be best explained by using the concept of fictional perspective.
Fictional discourses provide perhaps the most straightforward instances of free parametershift. Let us take the case of an actor playing Hamlet. Consider the following utterance from Act III, Scene ii: (4) I must be idle.
For the purposes of a formal analysis, one must, of course, disregard the contingent properties of an uttered sentence such as (4). What is interesting is instead the content-determining relation that holds between an abstract sequence of contextual parameters and the occurrence of the sentence type I must be idle in a context with that sequence. In this regard, it is important to realize that in the context of (4) the content of the first person pronoun is not determined by the agent of that context. If the context of the play, c, is depicted by <a, t, l, w>, then the agent of c should not be identified with c a . That means, in other words, that the actor of the play should not be conceived as asserting a proposition according to which he himself must be idle. In order to arrive at an intuitively correct result, the agent parameter must then somehow be shifted from c a to c a* , so that the content of ʻI' be determined by the relevant agent parameter of the play, c a* , that is, by Hamlet.
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The example may be generalized to many other cases of first-person sentences occuring in written or spoken fictional discourse. All these cases involve a nonstandard agent parameter which has to take over the content-determining role of the default agent parameter. For those who accept the relevance of fictional discourse to the Kaplanian semantics, the main explanatory task is then to find a general rule or principle which is able to explain the underlying mechanism of parameter-shifting.
Two solutions to the problem of parameter shift
Eros Corazza and Mark Whitsey have recently offered a sophisticated explanation of parameter-shifting which is deliberately conservative with respect to LD.
9 According to the view proposed by Corazza and Whitsey, indexical expressions behave in fictional discourses in accordance with the Kaplanian principles. Indexicals are directly referring singular terms, and as such they are immediately connected to the appropriate parameters of their actual context of use. One key difference is that in fictional discourses the content of indexicals is determined by empty parameters. Let us return for a moment to our earlier example from Hamlet, Act III, Scene ii:
(4) I must be idle.
Corazza and Whitsey would say that the actor playing Hamlet is not a likely candidate as a content-determining parameter for ʻI' in (4), and thus an alternative parameter must be found.
Obviously, the alternative parameter can only be Hamlet himself. On the basis of their antirealist convictions, Corazza and Whitsey would also say that because Hamlet does not exist, the fictional name Hamlet should be regarded as an empty term.
Two consequences follow from the above remarks. Firstly, the first person pronoun ʻI' in (4) acquires its content from a shifted agent parameter. This seems to be a superficial but correct observation. Secondly, the shifted parameter is an empty one, which induces a context block. In connection with this latter term, Corazza and Whitsey allude to a general feature of fictional discourses. They suggest, following Kendall Walton, that fictional contexts containing empty parameters are part of a language game that can be characterized by the mental act of pretending. Participiants of a fictional discourse pretend that in a blocked context indexical expressions behave in complete accordance with the conditions of their standard use. In uttering (4), for example, the actor pretends to be Hamlet, and the audience of the play participates in the pretence. Though the context is blocked because of the presence of an empty parameter, the first person pronoun ʻI' is pretended to denote Hamlet. According to the view under discussion, the content of ʻI', ʻhere', and ʻnow' must be evaluated in (1) with respect to an empty contextual parameter. More precisely, all three expressions are supposed to be connected to the one and the same empty parameter, and that is controversial. How can the content of different type of indexicals be determined by the same parameter? Corazza and Whitsey offer a solution to this problem by claiming that in fictional discourses indexicals contribute to the propositional content of sentences with more than the objects they denote. Their meanings are accompanied with a specific kind of information which could make their use cognitively significant. On this account, the cognitive significance of (1) can be traced back to the fact that the proposition expressed by it contains some piece of information about an agent, a location and a point of time. Such informations are sometimes identified with reflexive truth conditions. 11 In the case of (1), the satisfaction of these truth conditions requires merely that one understand the linguistic meaning of the sentence. At the level of reflexive truth conditions, (1) expresses (a), (b), and (c):
(a) There is an agent a of (1);
(b) a is located at the place of the context of (1);
(c) a is located at the time of the context of (1).
The distinctive feature of this reflexive content is that it is free from existential commitment.
It may be said, then, that (a), (b), and (c) captures fully the cognitive significance of the sentence I am here now, despite the fact that ʻI', ʻhere', and ʻnow' are determined by an empty parameter.
I think the expanation for parameter shift given by Corazza and Whitsey is very far from being conservative with respect to the Kaplanian semantics. Indexicals denote their objects directly in LD. As Kaplan has often stressed, these expressions contribute to the content of sentences in which they occur without the mediation of any other propositional component.
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So the claim that indexicals are endowed with a certain kind of surplus semantic information seems wholly incompatible with Kaplan's original insight. This is, hovewer, only the first controversial aspect of the proposal. The second difficulty is that even if it were accepted that reflexive truth conditions have to be involved in the evaluation of indexical sentences, the proposal would not be able to say anything about the underlying principles of parameter- There arises immediately the question of why to posit an additional contextual parameter if nothing in the meaning rules of indexicals requires it. The most plausible answer is that though the perspectival element remains unarticulated linguistically, the effect it produces is directly accessible in an epistemically relevant sense for the consumers of fictions. Everyone who possesses the concept of fiction knows fairly well that fictional sentences cannot be treated as if they were factual utterances.
Kaplanian contexts can be conservatively enriched with a nonstandard perspective parameter in the following simple way. In fictional discourses, a standard collection of parameters <a, t, l, w> takes the form of <a → a f , 
expresses the proposition that Hamlet must be idle, which is obviously true when evaluated at our actual world. As I have already mentioned in an endnote, the proper ontological status of the object denoted by the fictional proper name Hamlet is of no particular importance for the formal system of LD. From the point of view of the semantics of interpreted languages, Hamlet belongs clearly to the category of objects whatever ontological status it may be said to possess. We can take it that this ontologically unspecified object is the one which occurs as constituent in the proposition that Hamlet must be idle.
Our slightly modified version of LD seems to deliver an intuitively correct result also in the indexical-free case:
(5) Denmark's a prison.
The world parameter of (5) can be considered as obligatorily shifted from w to w f . The proposition the sentence type expresses in the context of the performance of the play is then the perspectival proposition that Denmark's a prison, which is true, again, at our actual world.
As it has already been stated above, perspective cannot be thought of as a standard contextual parameter since it is not a built-in element in the meaning rules of indexicals.
Neither can it be thought of as a particular kind of semantic object. It should instead be conceived as a content shift indicator: whenever consumers of fictions recognize its presence, they can come to know that an interpretive task must be performed in order to arrive at an empirically adequate evaluation of a certain set of sentences. Recognizing the presence of a shift indicator is, in one sense of the word, an extra-semantic task. 20 One has to recognize by way of experience or inference that the standard contextual resources are unsatisfactory for understanding a given sentence. But the same requirement holds for any semantic system sufficiently similar to LD: formal systems also have to detect proper contextual determinants for the sentences they are applied to. I think that is the key point. If the content of indexical sentences in fictional discourse gets enriched and modified by perspectival parameters, then the system of LD should mirror this fact. We are then driven to the conclusion that what sets off the process of parameter-shifting within formal models of indexicality is the quest for semantic content, and in the end, the quest for truth.
